DESIGNATING SPECIALLY PROTECTED AREAS IN RUSSIA: THE ROLE OF TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

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This paper analyses how transnational environmental non-governmental organisations, such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), have gained a role in preservation policy in Russia and cleared themselves a space and legitimating as non state actors 'balancing' the domestic pressures of expansive resource extraction. In Russia, both Greenpeace and WWF promote the establishment of specially protected high conservation value forests. In order to import innovative approaches to Russia, management practices developed in the West must be adopted to Russia’s unique post-Soviet context.

The paper is based on four case studies:
• Greenpeace project on designating specially protected areas in Karelia.
• Greenpeace project on designation of specially protected areas in Apatiti and Murmansk.
• WWF support for nature reserves infrastructure.
• WWF designation of Tschanom territory.

The descriptions of the ‘cases’ will finally end in comparing the experiences from the projects and assessing their successes and failures. The summarising questions are focused on the practices of multiscalar co-managing: How the NGOs has built their contacts to local people, entrepreneurs, and governments?

Key words: consumer boycott, conservation, old growth forest, specially protected area, ecological refuge, endogenous people.

Introduction. After Peresotrika and the opening of the borders of the former Soviet Union, Russia experienced a rapid in-flood of Western culture. After a little over a decade, an array of multinational companies have built infrastructure to facilitate their entrances into Russia’s economy. The environmental movement of the West, specifically large transnational environmental organizations, entered Russia and established active subsidiaries as quickly as commercial interests did. These organizations, bringing with them Western money, Western values, and Western ideas of nature protection, officially entered Russia’s political and economic spheres. Greenpeace came in 1992 and created a central office in Moscow, followed by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1994. Thus the expansion of Western environmentalism into Russia since the early 1990’s has brought with it ideas and concepts of nature conservation and techniques for managing specially protected areas.

Forests are one of the most important natural resources in Russia, both from the viewpoint of potential economic development as well as from that of environmental well
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being. According to figures published by WWF, Russia contains nearly 21% of the world’s entire timber reserve, and nearly 25% of the remaining untouched, virgin forests on the planet (WWF 2000). Greenpeace and WWF assign a planetary value to these forests, and so they have raised great amounts of money and effort into their protection. In this process, they have come to play an important role in Russian conservation politics.

In this paper we will look at how two large transnational environmental organizations, Greenpeace and WWF, bring the environmentalism of the West to Russia. In our cases, we will see how the Russian context alters the strategies and schemes of transboundary organizations. We will also see how these organizations encounter Russian government, industry, and public. This paper will illustrate the barriers they face in importing Western environmentalism to different stakeholders in the forest and different sectors of Russian society. We will highlight the strategies and opportunities that allow them to link and network and get their projects done. Thereby, specific characteristics of Russia political, economic, and social culture will come into light.

Many sociologists have described those aspects of globalization process that relate to environmental protection (Yearley, 1994; Sklair, 1994). Many reports have focused on the negative aspects of globalization for local communities and natural resources. As in our case, globalization processes can, in fact, be quite beneficial for the growth of environmental movements. There is a niche in environmental sociology concerning these positive outcomes (Spaargaren, Mol, Buttel, 2000). Our paper will pertain to this niche by showing the beneficial consequences of international NGOs protecting Russia’s forests.

Methodology and case study selection. By analyzing a total of four initiatives to protect Russia’s forested areas, we have isolated specific instances in which Greenpeace and WWF bring Western culture to Russia. We applied a qualitative case-study comparative approach (Yin 1994). This included fieldwork in which we visited each of the four localities and conducted a total of 82 in-depth interviews with all stakeholders – NGO representatives, government, industry, public, and science.

Our two Greenpeace cases take place in Karelia Republic and Murmansk Oblast along Russia’s border with Finland (i.e. Western Europe). Greenpeace, along with other NGOs, conducted an international consumer campaign in Europe highlighting the logging of valuable old-growth forests in these regions. By encouraging European buyers to boycott products from Russian old-growth, Greenpeace effectively eliminated the threat of logging. NGOs then tried to include these forests in new specially protected natural areas – one in Karelia and one in Murmansk. These cases are similar in regard to the distance to European markets, however, the character of both government and industry in Karelia and Murmansk differ. Murmansk’s regional government is more progressive and more willing to work with environmental NGOs. At the same time, forestry is less important in Murmansk’s economy because it is further north and lies mainly in a forest-tundra transition zone. These two cases illustrate the same third sector network striving for the same effect, however, its different levels of achievement depend heavily on regional differences.

With WWF, we chose to study two projects in support of the specially protected areas in Kamchatka where environmental protection is intimately linked with the revitalization of indigenous cultures. Traditional subsistence lifestyles, with an introduced commercial element, offer sustainable alternatives to industrial development. International environmental organizations are currently working with Russia’s many indigenous communities toward this end. The Kamchatka peninsula in the Russian Far East is a unique...
example of this work due to the extremely high value of its natural landscapes, which include active volcanoes, geysers, and hot springs, as well as its many indigenous populations. We look at World Wildlife Fund (WWF) attempt to simultaneously protect Kamchatka’s nature and revitalize its indigenous lifestyles and analyze both successes and failures in building networks with governments and citizens.

**Kalevala National Park Struggles.** Greenpeace-Russia’s forest campaign focuses primarily on the protection of old-growth forests in Northwest Russia. This program is in conjunction with the Forest Club, which includes the Russian NGOs: Center for Biodiversity Conservation (CBC) and the Socio-Ecological Union (SEU). It also includes the Nature Protection Corps, which began as an environmental structure in Soviet times that involved students in clean-ups and research. Using satellite images, the Forest Club inventoried and mapped virgin forests in the region. They take this data to the public of Europe, to the Russian government, and to companies involved in using the forest resources of this area. The Forest Club’s message is manifold: they list companies logging these old-growth forests, as well as those buyers in Europe that accept wood from these companies. They implore the European public to boycott products made with Russia’s old-growth wood. They warn timber companies and European buyers to establish moratoriums on logging these forests. With the Russian government, they try to initiate a process of creating a specially protected natural area in order to preserve the old-growth. This last effort also witnesses the introduction or nature protection measures created in the West, including National Parks, and UNESCO World Heritage Areas created by the United Nation.

The market protest gets its muscle from the extremely necessary and sought after economic links between Russia and the rest of Europe. For this reason, the Forest Club focuses on areas in Western Russia that rely on exporting timber to Western Europe. Companies logging old-growth in Karelia are breaking no laws or norms of the Russian Federation, however, NGOs are trying to enforce new global environmental laws that are beyond the control of any one state.

The Forest Club, led by Greenpeace, is trying to establish the concept of a “virgin forest” both in the legislation of the Russian Federation and in the awareness of industry and the public. The goal is to convince stakeholders in the forest that virgin forests have a value in the West and must be preserved. Russia’s legislation does recognize levels of value in a forest, including those of the “first level” which roughly corresponds to un-logged, old-growth. However, what Greenpeace is bringing from the West is an economic value and an urgency to preserve these forests. The concept of old-growth and its modern value grew in Western Europe where there is virtually no unlogged forests. The attempt to import this idea into Russian industry and government is not fluid, because Russia, unlike Western Europe, contains vast stands of virgin forest.

First Greenpeace’s campaign took place in the Republic of Karelia, which contains Russia’s longest border with Western Europe (Finland). Karelia offers Russian forestry a unique combination, in that it contains huge tracts of virgin forest with proximity to important timber markets of the West (Autio, 2002). As several researchers have recounted, in the early 1990’s, Greenpeace, the Forest Club, and the Taiga Rescue Network started an international consumer-information campaign that attempted to vilify companies logging Karelia’s old-growth, as well as those companies in Europe buying from them (Vorobiov, 1999; Yanitsky, 2000). The campaign included numerous publications, videos, conferences, and protests. The NGOs investigated the timber sources for publishing houses in England, Holland, and Germany, and requested that they boycott the logging of Karelia’s old-growth. This culminated in 1996 with a series of publicized protests both in the forests of Karelia and at the pulp-and-paper mill of the large Finnish logging company Enso
(Yanitsky, 2000) This led to Enso’s announcement of a one-year moratorium on logging in three important plots of the disputed forests in Karelia. In 1997, several companies, both Finnish and Russian, joined the moratorium.

All funding for this campaign came from Western Europe. Many Greenpeace branches in Europe redirected some of their funds specifically for this work in Karelia conducted by Greenpeace-Russia. Money for the establishment of specially protected natural areas along Karelia’s border with Finland came from the Tacis Program, through which the European Union provides grants for the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Tacis gave the Karelian government 3.5 million dollars to establish two new national parks, one of them Kalevala National Park, and build tourist and nature protection infrastructure for two already in existence. For the Russian government, the overwhelming interest of European NGOs and European governments in Karelia’s forests is not readily explicable. In our interview with government officials, we heard various theories - NGOs are saboteurs trying to undermine Russian forestry for the benefit of Scandinavian competitors, or NGOs are exaggerating the urgency of protecting Russia’s virgin forests and biodiversity, both of which currently abound. A prevalent accusation given by all government officials was that Europe logged nearly all of its own old-growth forest and so is creating a double-standard by forcing Russia to preserve those, which remain. An independent scientist agreed with this last sentiment, saying, “[Kalevala park] will have significance for all of Europe . . . They cut everything on their territories and we will preserve on our territory. In their own country they use forests like orchards in rows, and on our territory they will use it for recreation so that they can see wild nature and have fun” (Interview, 2002). Furthermore, government officials as well as independent scientists lament that even if the Tacis grant helps to establish new national parks, the Russian government does not have enough money to maintain them. One of respondents from science said, “We have two acting parks and if it were not for international projects like Tacis, the parks would sit on the budget and nothing would be done with them. The director of a park normally gets 200 rubles a month, but from Tacis he got 80 times his annual salary. Such support is impossible to get absolutely permanent” (Interview with scientist from Karelia Science Center, 2002).

This campaign was the first to demonstrate such a relationship between Western Europe and Russia. It helped shed light on the difficulties and complications of bringing Western environmentalism to Russia. By demonstrating Greenpeace’s influence, this case set a precedent for all future environmental initiatives throughout Russia. It showed environmental organizations what must be done to accomplish certain nature preservation tasks. For instance, in designating Kalevala National Park and writing its justification, Greenpeace operated through a local student environmental NGO SPOK and scientists from the Karelia Science Center. NGOs in Russia frequently must do technical work in place of the government. A SPOK workers said,

“In the West . . . you spread knowledge about the problem and immediately the public begins to participate. The authorities get kicked and then they understand the problem well and begin to do something . . . From Russian power structures there is no action . . . To achieve something here you need first to make a big noise, and then secondly you need just to do everything yourself, in place of the government. And then you will achieve results” (Interview with head of SPOK, 2002).
Greenpeace is known throughout the world to take a radical and confrontational standpoint, and the Russian government received a rude introduction to Western NGOs. While scientists completed documents for Kalevela National Park, the governor of Karelia refused to sign it into existence for many years. Government officials that we interviewed argued a strict “forestry is economy” line, emphasizing the need to produce given the region’s poor economy since Perestroika. The forest sector is indeed Karelia’s strongest source of wealth, and it has been so since tsarist times. But another source of the government’s annoyance with Greenpeace’s effort to stop the logging of old-growth was the fact that a non-governmental, and even foreign, interest was trying to dictate what and how the Russian government should conduct their business. One respondent said,

“I want this project conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation and by the government of the Russian Federation . . . and Karelia Republic. Here, however, this project is not well coordinated. It is chaotic. Greenpeace came here and handcuffed themselves. Moscow is far from here, but pretty girls and boys came from there in white pants and skirts and made noise, noise, noise . . . I would like our state to take into its hands all positions and solutions to this issue. Those who come here with their own initiatives should know there place . . . They have the right to voice what they want, but initiatives and decision-making should come from the power structures and the state.” (Interview with head of Karelia Ministry of Natural Resources, 2002).

Here we see the issue of national sovereignty. This respondent seemed dismayed that any initiative should come from a foreign non-governmental source. Throughout this project, there remained a blatant gap in communication between NGOs and Karelia’s government. Those government officials that are directly involved in the creation of specially protected areas, specifically Karelia’s governor Katinandov and the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, refused to meet with environmental NGOs. One of our respondents from the NGO SPOK said,

“They [Greenpeace] tried very much to arrange meetings. And when the meeting was set up, they [the Karelian government] put there only assistant governors who were available at that moment. This came to no agreement. They came to the meetings and were saying ‘yes yes’ and shaking their heads. Or they would show up and say that they cannot have the interaction today. Sometimes they were just silent and said nothing. Sometimes they said simply ‘we don’t support the issue’. But with Katinandov himself, whose status allows him to say either yes or no [to the proposed park], a meeting was never arranged. This is just not understandable” (Interview with SPOK, 2002).

About the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, one of our Greenpeace informants said,

“It is absolutely impossible to reach him or arrange a meeting. He does not talk with representatives of NGOs. It is his principle. He doesn’t even say hello. . . It is impossible to have a normal conversation with them”. (Interview with coordinator of GP Forest Campaign, 2002).

Greenpeace and local activists wrote letters, however, these attempts also met with a stiff self-aggrandizement of the Russian government. A specific rule in Karelia requires
that the government respond to any letter or request within one month after it is received. According to our NGO informants, government officials frequently waited the entire month, and then sent responses, such as “we wrote to Katinandov and he will analyze the situation and answer to the government and to you about what exactly is going on’ . . . But nobody does anything. Everybody just has correspondents and nothing is done” (Interview with head of SPOK, 2002). Based on this poor interaction, one of our Greenpeace respondents has called the Karelia Republic a “museum of socialism” (Interview with coordinator of Greenpeace Forest Campaign).

We can see that Greenpeace is not only bringing the value of “old-growth” to Karelia, but also, to the government’s dismay, the strength of the third-sector, as it has developed in the Western world. Greenpeace and its fellow NGOs were able to bring a logging moratorium on these forests without the consent of the Russian government. Companies that already had old-growth forests under rent had to break their contract agreements to log within a specified time. Furthermore, the leskhozes that contained these forests signed illegal agreements with NGOs stating that in the future they would not rent these forests to any company. Our government respondents were especially angered at this. With the help of economic interests, Greenpeace and the Forest Club practically overpowered the government of Russia on this issue. Thus we can see, interestingly enough, that due to the political and economic changes of the 1990’s, the future well-being of Russia’s old-growth forests largely depends on the strength of the West’s third-sector.

This case saw virtually no interaction between NGOs and industry, beyond the consumer campaign of the 1990’s. During this time, all international companies working in the disputed old-growth forests of Karelia abandoned their rent. No company, Russian or foreign, would apply to log these forests, and so NGOs had no further business with industrial stakeholders.

**Partnering with Business: Lapland Forest – Murmansk Oblast.** Another case of the Forest Club’s work, this one in Murmansk Oblast, illustrates the importance of Russia’s commercial interests in Europe as a primary vehicle for importing environmental standards to Russia. This region is just north of Karelia, also bordering Finland, and its forest industry was also effected by the Forest Club’s campaign. This case shows a remarkably different relationship between NGOs and the region’s government. Greenpeace and the Forest Club, represented in Murmansk by the Kolski branch of the CBC, were able to influence the government much more so than in Karelia for two reasons. First, forestry is not Murmansk’s main industry as its landscape is dominated by less-valuable forest-tundra. Thus, unlike in Karelia where forests are extremely valuable, the government is more willing to make concessions to protect forests over which Europe is producing hub-bub. The second and more important reason that NGOs were able to reach agreements with the government was the help of one influential businessman in the region.

The company ZAO ‘Priroda’ is the largest forest producer in Murmansk oblast and rents part of Lapland Forest, which contains virgin boreal forests. The head of this company is well respect by government and by environmental activists alike. The success of the company can be partially attributed to their use of modern Finnish technology and their access to Western timber markets. These international markets also became the main tool for environmental NGOs to influence the operations of ZAO ‘Priroda’. After the protest campaign in Karelia, and much discussion and debate, the company signed an informal agreement to halt logging old-growth forests. The head of ZAO “Priroda” said,

“We take into account our image with western consumers, otherwise they won’t buy our product. I am against leaving such a huge territory for a nature preserve. But I
have to comply. My partnership with the greens is not a real partnership – it is pressure. The partnership between entrepreneurs and greens is like the partnership between a big fish and a little fish, or like traffic police and drivers. This is compliance with the law and not a partnership . . . If we are not partners, then I will be out of work” (Interview, 2002).

His rhetoric of “police” and “law” illustrates the strength of the consumer market campaign and those NGOs that conducted it. The environmental concerns and economic concerns of the West have come to Russia hand-in-hand, and both industry and government are put under intense pressure to comply. The environmentally sensitive markets of Europe have become the number one most powerful bargaining chip for Western environmentalism in the former Soviet Union. If Russia is actually changing and “greening”, the sensitivity of European markets is truly the reason.

In Murmansk Oblast, the Forest Club used European markets to link with the Russian company ZAO ‘Priroda’, and then used its links with this company to influence the Russian government. First, the leskhoz agreed not to rent the disputed forests to logging companies. One respondent from CBC said, “The leskhoz gave the territories for protection because they are primarily interested in a good relationship with him [the head of ZAO ‘Priroda’]. When he tells the leskhoz what to do, they listen” (Interview with Kolski CBC staff, 2002). NGOs reached an agreement with the regional administration with the same ease. According to the head of ZAO ‘Priroda’,

“I come in and say ‘sign a paper for the green guys’ and [administration] will sign it in a moment and not even think about it. For example, in the Kolski region we decided not to cut. The greens decided they wanted to protect the forests. If I did not say to administration that I agree, administration would never sign anything with the greens… If I did not help the greens then [CBC] would have to spend plenty of time trying. But with me, they got a signature in 15 minutes” (Interview, 2002).

This statement does well to illustrate the way in which environmental organizations can effectively move the Russian government as they want.

**WWF conservation projects in Kamchatka.** The Kamchatka peninsula is made up of two regions: Kamchatka oblast in the south (capital, Petropavlovsk) and Koryak Autonomous Okrug in the north (capital, Palana). Compared to Koryak okrug, Kamchatka oblast has a warmer climate, more roads and infrastructure, and more geological activity to attract tourism. Kamchatka oblast also houses the main city Petropavlovsk which serves as Kamchatka’s hub of transportation, commerce, and communication. Despite Koryak Okrug’s new independence, much of its government agencies, including the Ministry of Natural Resources, still operate out of Petropavlovsk in the south. In order to highlight the differences between the two regional contexts, we compare WWF’s work in Kamchatka oblast compared to similar efforts in Koryak okrug.

The following two case studies are part of WWF’s worldwide effort entitled “Living Planet” in which it has highlighted 200 ecologically significant regions of the world and works to protect them. The Kamchatka peninsula contains several of these hotspots. WWF sees eco-tourism as the ideal path of economic development of these valuable regions, in that it would promote the preservation of nature and allow traditional lifestyles to secure income. WWF, in both Kamchatka oblast and Koryak Okrug, is
investing in improved eco-tourism infrastructure, supporting indigenous peoples through communication technology, and funding broad-based environmental education programs.

Like all indigenous cultures throughout Russia, those of Kamchatka - the Koryak, Itelmen, Even, and Chukchi in the north, have suffered much since the advent of Russians. In tsarist times, the Russian Empire’s expansion east brought Christianity, as well as marauding Cossacks demanding tributes in fur from the natives. Periodic battles and uprising along with introduced diseases decreased indigenous populations. Later, Soviet policy towards indigenous peoples brought even more far-reaching changes to the cultures and lifestyles of Kamchatka’s indigenous inhabitants. The State Committee for Numerically-Small Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East oversaw this policy, operating with the primary goal of turning the natives from aboriginal semi-nomads into full citizens of modern Soviet society. Two policies in particular, “collectivization” and “centralization”, brought on a significant break with traditional culture. The former, as disturbing to poor subsistence fishermen as to the Whites of the Bolshevik revolution, saw the confiscation and shuffling of personal items. The latter forcibly moved small, subsistence-based community clans into more centralized villages. This allowed the state to more efficiently deliver subsidies, which included bread, coffee, tea, sugar, and other basics. Natives were put to work in suffhozes, and children were sent to boarding schools for Western education.

After perestroika, subsidies halted abruptly, economies soured, and natives turned to nature for survival, often facing degraded natural resources and a loss of traditional subsistence knowledge. Kamchatka’s indigenous populations had grown dependent on state subsidies, and the quality of life declined, as did reindeer populations. Battles are currently raging over Kamchatka’s natural resources, with powerful mining and oil drilling interests.

**Nalichevo and Bistrinski National Parks.** In Kamchatka oblast in 1997, WWF originally set out to support all nature preserves in the region, however, it has since focused its efforts on two – Nalichevo and Bistrinski National Parks. Over the last five years, WWF has funded various ways of making Nalichevo park more tourist-friendly, including building an eco-center, improving garbage removal, building two houses for over-night tourists, and creating a 100 km WWF ecological trail complete with the Panda logo, markers, bridges, lookouts, and changing stalls near swimmable geothermal features. Funding for this comes from WWF Moscow in the form of small grants, each allocated for a specific construction project in the park. The main partnership of this effort exists between WWF and the government of Kamchatka oblast, specifically the Director of Kamchatka Nature Parks who oversees implementation. This state employee formerly worked for Petropavlovsk’s Tourist Club for 25 years, and now uses its members in a volunteer system for the grunt work of WWF’s construction projects. He provides an all-paid (by WWF) opportunity for those interested to visit Nalichevo in return for a week of construction work. The use of the Tourist Club shows an additional and important connection between tourism and the development of environmental protection infrastructure. The Russian government does not contribute any funding to this project, however, our interviews with administrators found only praise of WWF’s work.

Bystrinski represents a slightly more complicated situation than Nalichevo, in that two mixed-nationality villages, as well as native Even reindeer herders, are situated within its borders. Here, WWF bought 11 radio stations and supplied reindeer herders and others living independently and far from the villages with radio equipment. This new communication technology provided individuals with the possibility of speaking with friends and family and reporting medical emergencies. Supporting subsistence economies in this way also supports eco-tourism, in that, for tourists, indigenous lifestyles are an
attractive addendum to its nature. The man chosen by WWF to distribute these radio stations also oversees communication among tourist clubs and expeditions within the park. Because of this choice of overseer, the same reindeer herders that benefit from increased communications also benefit from more tourist visits due to the more tourist-friendly communications technology. Overall, by giving these radio stations WWF has helped preserve the indigenous lifestyle as an integral part of the ecosystem and the tourism industry.

The environmental education aspect of this project features the Kamchatka Club of Friends of WWF, led by Romanova, a local teacher and non-profit activist. WWF wisely chose this leader, and because of her excellent initiative and enthusiasm the club became a great success. WWF funds her salary and educational projects through small, personal grants. The club uses these funds to buy arts and crafts supplies and to organize region-wide student gatherings and contests. One of the larger WWF-sponsored events is the Ecological Natural History Contest. Interested schools are given a list of ecology literature in preparation for contests of environmental knowledge. Another contest, the “Eco-Marathon” involves 500 students each year in seminars, crafts, and environmental contests. Students contribute essays on ecology and compete to make the best WWF Panda out of provided materials. The latter serves as a fun activity for children, as well as an advertisement for WWF.

Tschanom case. In Koryak Autonomous Okrug, WWF’s project recently ended, however, it consisted of a more focused effort than in Kamchatka oblast. Beginning in 1997, this project tried to create a Territory of Traditional Land Use (TTNU) along with the Itelmen people of the okrug. While WWF provided funding, met with state decision-makers, and helped streamline the project, much of the legwork was done by the Itelmen Cultural Restoration Council “Tschanom” and the Moscow-based ethnographer Olga Murashka. Murashka brought the idea of an ethno-ecological refuge to Russia in the early 1990’s, basing it on a similar model from Brazil, and subsequently linked with Tschanom to make the idea a reality in Koryak okrug (Zaporodsky, Morashka 2000). This effort included much public participation - village meetings were periodically held in the village Kavran in order to inform the larger Itelmen community and take suggestions. The year 1998 saw much negotiations with the okrug government and refining of the proposed territory, its boundaries, and its nature protection regime. That November, WWF organized a press conference in Germany where the idea for the territory, which would be called “Tschanom”, presented within the framework of WWF’s Gift for the Earth program received much enthusiasm. WWF then took this international support back to Kamchatka, and on December 2, 1998, the governor of Koryak Okrug Branevich signed a decree for the creation TTNU Tschanom (Zaporodsky, Morashka 2000). This was an internationally celebrated success for both environmental and native rights interests.

Accompanying the creation of the territory were efforts to develop health, education, and social services, and to fight unemployment and alcoholism. Similarly with Bystrinksi National Park in Kamchatka oblast, WWF supported nature protection in Tschanom through donated technology and trainings. This program would train members of the native population as professional nature-protection inspectors. Four inspectors received licenses in 1999 and began repair work on a run-down nature protection station within the territory (Murashka 2001). WWF provided these inspectors with two snowmobiles, two trucks, two motorboats, and radio equipment for more efficient communication. WWF also planned to help finance an information center that would inform the Itelmen public on their rights, the ecology of the territory of Tschanom, and other problems and issues related to the ethno-ecological refuge.
On December 7, 2000, Koryak Autonomous Okrug elected a new governor V. Loginov, and, within 100 days, he issued an order canceling the decree of the former governor and officially closing the territory of traditional nature use Tschanom (Murashka 2001a). In a general letter, the new governor claimed that the creation of the territory, as outlined in the documentation, was in violation of both federal and regional legislation concerning territories of traditional land use (Murashka 2001a). Beginning at this time, a new movement sought to contest this cancellation. The NGO Tschanom began a letter writing campaign to the new governor and other regional and federal state agents. They also linked with the NGO Rodnick, which has many lawyers specializing in environmental protection and the rights of indigenous peoples in Russia. They brought several lawsuits, including one before the Krasno-Presininsky court in Moscow, protesting the okrug governor’s action and the disregard for indigenous communities shown by the Russian government and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Murashka 2002). Rodnick lawyers lost this case, as well as the subsequent appeal, and further lawsuits are now pending. Murashka is also helping this effort, including rewriting and resubmitting applications for a new, legal TTNU.

WWF is conspicuously absent from this effort. Since the territory was closed, WWF has frozen all of its activities in Koryak okrug. They are not involved in the battle to reestablish the territory, nor are they putting any money toward the upkeep of the equipment that they donated. This disappointed many natives involved in Tschanom and brought much criticism from other activists in the environmental and native rights movements.

**Discussion and Conclusion.** Russia has a long history of environmental activism, especially in the academic circles. Under the Soviet rule, such activism was often a veiled form of protest against government economic and industrialization policies. Environmentally minded scientists and academic managed to establish large natural preserve areas, where logging and other forms of commercial exploitation were either prohibited or severely restricted (Weiner, 1999; Perepjolkin and Figatner, 1997). The political reforms initiated in the 1990s opened the opportunity for foreign actors, such as transboundary NGOs, to operate with relative freedom inside the Russian society and preservation efforts become international.

This opening of the political system created unprecedented opportunities of collaboration between domestic environmental NGOs and international environmental NGO networks. In all four cases that we studied international NGOs were the driving forces of conservation initiatives. Our research shows that these NGOs play unique enabling roles in the implementation of environmentally sustainable use of natural resources program in Russia that neither the government, nor the private sector is equipped to fill.

Our finding demonstrate the changing of the role of the State in environmental governance in Russia on the same line with other scholars studying other countries and contexts (Young, 1994; Castels, 1998). Our case study on the designation of Kalevala national park shows that under the globalization context international actors and networks can overcome national governmental resistance and international pressure can in fact force the government to change the initial decision. We have seen transboundary organizations working across this border, appealing to the environmental consciousness of consumers in order to legitimize supply chains. With corporate and NGO networks extending across the border, decisions made by environmentally conscious European consumers penetrate and influence Russia. As a result, European influence has created maps of old-growth forest throughout Russia, new nature preserves, and the value of the concept of old-growth forest.
Even though the concept of old-growth has no backing within Russian legislation, it has become a value, and part of the vernacular, among Russia’s scientists, third sector, and forestry producers. This result is due directly to the consumer market campaign, which took place in Europe, on the other side of the border. Government officials initially refused to talk to NGOs representatives, viewing their demand as misguided an unreasonable and an unfair intrusion in domestic issues. However, facing international pressure, the government suspended logging operations in 1999, and in 2002 signed the decree creating the Kalevala National Park.

In the case of Lapland forest government resistance to the designation of the specially protected area was much less than in Karelia due to the fact that logging is much less profitable in the northern tundra areas. The governmental mistrust to NGOs was also high, however business representative helped to reach the compromise. This case demonstrates new complicated governance arrangements which take place in Russia.

Tschanom case shows that there are limitations in confronting the State in Russia. The state owns land and its natural resources, so the specially protected areas can not be designated without governmental approval. Tschanom territory of nature use by the endogenous people quickly turned from the success to total failure because of governmental reelection. The mission of the WWF project was the development of indigenous self-governance and self-subsistence, with a heavy emphasis on the preservation and sustainable use of the natural resources in the Tschanom territory. However, the interests of the new governor were different. He actively promoted gold and platinum mining in the area, and saw the traditional nature use, and the need to obtain the necessary permits from the indigenous tribes, as an obstacle to those plans. He rescinded the respective legislation signed by his predecessor on a legal technicality, which effectively terminated the traditional land use project. Although his decision is now being appealed in courts, it effectively halted all efforts maintain the preserve.

Russian government usually supports projects which bring money to the regional infrastructure. Bystrinski and Nalichevo National Parks are WWF projects aiming at aiding a specially protected area in the Kamchatka region, which were already established but lacked infrastructure. This effort is a result of a close cooperation between an international environmental organization (WWF), a local civic group and a local government agency – the National Parks of Kamchatka Province. The local government was very supportive of the projects, in part because of their economic potential resulting from bringing eco-tourism to the area.

Although not all projects are equally successful, our research shows the major role that well-funded international environmental organizations can play in nature protection and cultural revitalization efforts throughout Russia. In addition to Western money, WWF and Greenpeace bring a rich experience to their partnership organizations and local environmental groups.

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ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯ СПЕЦІАЛЬНИХ ПРИРОДООХОРОННИХ ТЕРИТОРІЙ У РОСІЇ: РОЛЬ ТРАНСКОРДОННИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ ОХОРОНИ ДОВКІЛЛЯ

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Проведено аналіз діяльності міжнародних неурядових організацій охорони довкілля (таких, як “Greenpeace” та “World Wildlife Fund (WWF)”), описано, як вони стали на природоохоронний шлях в Росії, здобули право на діяльність як неурядові організації “завдяки” активним дебатах щодо надмірного видобування ресурсів. У Росії “Greenpeace” та “WWF” пропонують утворення лісів високої консерваційної
цінності, що знаходяться під спеціальною охороною. Для того, щоб застосувати найновіші підходи в Росії, необхідно адаптувати західні практики менеджменту на особливому пострадянському просторі.

Стаття основана на дослідженні чотирьох територій:

- Спеціальних природоохоронних територій у Карелії – проектах “Greenpeace”;
- Спеціальних природоохоронних територій у Апатиті та Мурманську – проект “Greenpeace”;
- Природних заповідників, інфраструктури яких підтримуються “WWF”;
- Території “Тщаному”, утвореної за ініціативою “WWF”.

Проведено аналіз результатів досліджень цих територій, дано оцінку рівню успішності і невдач. У підсумку увагу сконцентровано на практиках універсального співменеджменту: як неурядовим організаціям увійти в контакт з місцевим населенням, підприємцями та урядом.

Ключові слова: бойкот споживачів, збереження, старі ліси, території під спеціальною охороною, екологічні заповідники, ендогенне населення.

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